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The global financial crisis 
and the implications for 
corporate governance and
regulation
particularly robust. The explanation of why
investment banks and other financial institutions
took such spectacular risks with extremely
leveraged positions on many securities and
derivatives, and the risk management, governance
and ethical environment that allowed such
conduct to take place demands detailed analysis.
Origins of the crisis
In the cyclical way markets work, the historical
origins of the 2008 financial crisis may be found
in the solutions to the previous market crisis. The
US Federal Reserve under the sage Alan Greenspan
responded to the collapse of confidence caused by
the dotcom disaster and Enron failures in
2001–2002 by reducing US interest rates to one
per cent, their lowest in 45 years, flooding the
market with cheap credit to jumpstart the
economy back into life. US business did recover
faster than expected, but the cheap credit washed
into the financial services and housing sectors
producing the largest speculative bubbles ever
witnessed in the American economy. 
The scene was set by the 1999 dismantling of
the 1932 Glass-Steagall Act which had separated
commercial banking from investment banking
and insurance services, opening the way for a
consolidation of the vastly expanding and
increasingly competitive US financial services
industry. Kevin Phillips described this as a
‘burgeoning debt and credit complex’.1
The current crisis originated on Wall Street
where deregulation unleashed highly incentivised
investment banks to flood world markets with
toxic financial products. As a stunning series of
banks and investment companies collapsed in the
United States and in Europe, a frightening
dimension of the global economy became fully
apparent: a new world disorder of violently
volatile markets and deep financial insecurity.
The prolonged systemic crisis in internationalfinancial markets which commenced in mid-
2007 and continues to develop, is also a crisis in
corporate governance and regulation. The most
severe financial disaster since the Great Depression
has exposed the dangers of unregulated financial
markets and nominal corporate governance. This
financial crisis is larger in scale than any crisis
since the 1930s involving losses estimated by the
IMF in October 2008 as potentially US$1,400
billion, eclipsing earlier crises in Asia, Japan and
the US (see Figure 1).
The market capitalisation of the stock markets
of the world peaked at US$62 trillion at the end of
2007, but were by October 2008 in freefall, having
lost US$33 trillion dollars, over half of their value,
in 12 months of unrelenting financial and
corporate failures. A debate has continued for
some time about the costs and benefits of the
financialisation of advanced industrial economies.
The long progression of financial crises around the
world served as a reminder that the global
financial system is neither self-regulating nor
M A R C H  2 0 0 9  K E E P I N G  G O O D  C O M P A N I E S
• Crisis originated by deregulated
financial markets in the US, releasing a
flood of toxic financial products 
• As increased financialisation of the
world economy took hold, regulation
was considerably lightened
• Likely that global regulation of
international business and market
oversight will be increasingly accepted
Key Issues C O M PA N Y  S E C R E TA R Y
By Professor Thomas Clarke, Director, UTS Centre
for Corporate Governance
70
As the new financial instruments were developed
and marketed, the securities markets grew massively
in the 2000s dwarfing the growth of the real
economy. For example, according to the Bank of
International Settlements the global derivatives
markets grew at the rate of 32 per cent per annum
from 1990, and the notional amount of derivatives
reached US$106 trillion by 2002, US$477 trillion by
2006, and exceeded US$531 trillion by 2008 (though
gross market value is a small fraction of this).3
The supposed purpose of this increasingly
massive exercise was to hedge risk and add liquidity
to the financial system. Derivatives allow financial
institutions and corporations to take greater and
more complex risks such as issuing more mortgages
and corporate debt, because they may protect debt
holders against losses. Since derivatives contracts are
widely traded, risk may be further limited, though
this increases the number of parties exposed if
defaults occur.
As Nobel Prize winner in Economics Joseph
Stiglitz argued ‘America’s financial institutions have
not managed risk; they have created it’.4 Innovative
Wall Street investment bank securities originally
conceived to insulate against risk, metastasised
through immense misuse into the wide distribution
of acutely dangerous and uncontrollable risks.
Instead of risk being hedged, it has become
interconnected and international, and unknown.
Financialisation
Understanding financial markets, let alone coordinating
or regulating them, is now a great deal more difficult
since they have become much larger, inter-
connected and internationalised. Relative to gross
domestic product, the financial sector in all of the
industrial countries grew considerably in the last two
decades of financial deregulation, innovation and
globalisation. The size of financial assets in both the US
and UK has more than doubled in 20 years. The massive
growth of the UK finance sector and also the sustained
growth of the European finance sectors involved the
adoption of similar financial innovation and exotic
instruments as in the United States. British and
European financial institutions have also succumbed to
the temptations of high leverage (in some cases higher
than the Wall Street investment banks), minimal risk
management, and a fascination with the returns that
new financial securities and speculative industries —
most notably the property sector — might deliver. 
In the UK the financial sector became
gargantuan, with assets around nine times GDP, a
multiple more than double that of the US finance
sector (see Figure 2). A concentration on financial
services is considered in the US and UK as an
essential part of the new economy, and was
associated with rapid market growth, high profits
and very high salaries for a privileged few dealing in
the most exotic financial securities.
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Bank losses (in billions of US dollars, left scale)













Sources: World Bank; and IMF staff estimates
Note: US subprime costs represent staff estimates of losses on banks and other financial institutions.
All costs are in real 2007 dollars. Asia includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, the
Philippines, and Thailand.
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Fuelling the whole process of financialisation
were volcanic eruptions of debt. When Alan
Greenspan became Chairman of the Federal
Reserve in 1987 public and private debt in the US
totalled US$10.5 trillion, but after his departure in
2006 it had quadruped to US$43 trillion.
Meanwhile financial services including finance,
insurance and real estate now account for over
20 per cent of the US GDP, with manufacturing
shrinking to 12 per cent. In Australia similar
processes of largely private debt accumulation have
grown the finance sector to 19.4 per cent of GNP
while manufacturing has fallen to 10.1 per cent.
A debate has continued for some time about
the costs and benefits of the financialisation of
advanced industrial economies. The increasing
role of financial markets, financial institutions,
financial managers, and financial motives in the
basic operation of both domestic and
international economies is a continuing concern.
What happened to the real economy where people
produced goods and services that other people
enjoyed? 
As the Archbishop of Canterbury argued
recently: 
Trading the debts of others without
accountability has been the motor of
astronomical financial gain for many in recent
years…The crisis exposes the element of basic
unreality in the situation — the truth that almost
unimaginable wealth has been generated by
equally unimaginable levels of fiction, paper
transactions with no concrete outcome beyond
profit for traders. The biggest challenge in the
present crisis is whether we can recover some
sense of the connection between money and
material reality – the production of specific
things, the achievement of recognisable human
goals that have something to do with a shared
sense of what is good for the human community
in the widest sense.6
Regulation
Financial institutions that deliver an efficient and
liquid supply of finance and credit are critical to
the operation of any economy, and traditionally
are subject to a framework of firm regulation.
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Sources: US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; UK Office of National Statistics; 
European Central Bank; and IMF staff estimates.
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However, as the financialisation of the US and
international economy proceeded, paradoxically the
regulatory touch lightened considerably. In the
words of one US finance expert, in the years before
the crisis:
We were developing a system of very large, highly
levered, undercapitalised financial institutions —
including the investment banks, some large money
centre banks, the insurance companies with large
derivative books and the government-sponsored
entities… Regulators believe that all of these are too
big to fail and would bail them out if necessary. The
owners, employees and creditors of these
institutions are rewarded when they succeed, but it
is all of us — the taxpayers — who are left on the
hook if they fail. This is called private profits and
socialised risk. Heads I win. Tails, you lose. It is a
reverse Robin Hood system.7
The regulatory authorities, ratings agencies, and
risk management of the financial institutions
themselves all failed spectacularly. In the US the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2004
introduced a new rule essentially allowing large
broker-dealers to use their own risk management
practices for regulatory purposes enabling a lowering
of their capital adequacy requirements (the core
capital which a financial institution is required to
hold to support its risk-taking activities). The problem
was that many of these risk-management practices
were ineffective or non-operating in the context of
the frantic securities deal making of the time. 
It is the job of the credit ratings agencies to
assess the risk associated with particular financial
institutions and financial instruments, in order to
give investors a better understanding of the risks
they face. Yet the question asked by everybody
when the financial crisis erupted was how could
asset backed securities containing subprime
mortgages and other high-risk debt possibly be
given AA credit ratings by Standard & Poor’s or
Moody’s?
The answer is again that financial innovation
has outpaced regulatory effectiveness. The ratings
agencies instead of monitoring rigorously the
growth of financial markets and instruments have
become junior partners in this enterprise. Coffee in
his critique of the failure of the gatekeeper
professions in US corporate governance including
auditors, corporate lawyers, and securities analysts,
raises serious issues regarding rating agencies: 
• their entrenched market duopoly
• the conflict of interest in the agencies receiving
their revenue for the issuers of debt products
• their capacity to understand the underlying
assets and cash flows involved in complex
structured finance products and 
• the fact that ratings agencies do not review how
the risk profile of debt products may change in
different market conditions.8
Risk management
In financial businesses themselves, innovation in
financial products has far exceeded the capacity of
risk management measurement and monitoring
tools to gauge risk, with undue reliance on the VaR
(value at risk) measure which does not evaluate risk
in the most extreme circumstances. As the
penetrating report on the reasons for the $44 billion
writedowns at UBS reveals:
The investment bank was focused on the
maximization of revenue. There appears to have
been a lack of challenge on the risk and reward to
business area plans within the investment bank at a
senior level. UBS’s review suggests an asymmetric
focus in [the investment bank] senior management
meetings on revenue and profit and loss, especially
when compared to discussion of risk issues.9
As with many other US, UK and European
banks, UBS sailed blithely towards the iceberg of the
subprime mortgage crisis in a state of profound
ignorance:
Presentations of Market Risk Control to UBS’s senior
governance bodies did not provide adequate
granularity of subprime positions UBS held in its
various businesses. No warnings were given to
group senior management about the limitations of
the presented numbers or the need to look at the
broader contextual framework and the findings
were not challenged with perseverance.10
Getting the incentives very wrong
The final and most critical part of the explanation of
why investment banks and other financial
institutions took such extreme risks with highly
leveraged positions in complex securities, neglecting
risk management, governance principles, and often
basic business ethics, was that they had enormous
incentives to do so. As the UBS report concludes:
It remains the case that bonus payments for
successful and senior international business fixed
income traders, including those in the businesses
holding subprime positions were significant.
Essentially, bonuses were measured against gross
revenue after personnel costs, with no formal
account taken of the quality and sustainability of
those earnings.11
Massively incentivised irresponsibility became
the operating compensation norm in the financial
community, as banks and fringe financial
institutions chased the super profits available as
global financial markets expanded exponentially.
Consequences
While the accumulated cost of the global financial
crisis is being realised, the commitment to establish
a new international financial regulatory framework
increases, culminating in the G20 meeting. The
general market assistance and specific rescue
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Table 1: Subprime losses by
international banks, October 2008




Merrill Lynch US 54.6
Washington Mutual US 45.6
UBS Switzerland 44.2
HSBC UK 27.4
Bank of America US 21.2
JP Morgan Chase US 18.8
Morgan Stanley US 15.7
IKB Deutsche Germany 14.7
Royal Bank of Scotland UK 16.5
Lehman Brothers US 18.2
AIG US 16.8
Fannie Mae US 12.7
Deutsche Bank Germany 11.4
Ambac US 10.3
Wells Fargo US 10.0
MBIA Inc US 9.4
Barclays UK 9.2
Credit Agricole France 8.6
Credit Suisse Switzerland 8.1
HBOS UK 7.5
Canadian Imperial Bank 
of Commerce Canada 7.1
Fortis Belgium/ 6.9
Netherlands
Bayerische Landesbank Germany 6.7
Freddie Mac US 6.7
ING Netherlands 6.5
Societe Generale France 6.4
Mizuho Financial Group Japan 6.2
Dresdner Bank Germany 5.0
Bear Sterns US 3.4
WestLB Germany 3.1
BNP Paribas France 2.7
UniCredit Italy 2.7
Lloyds TSB UK 2.6
Nomura Holdings Japan 2.5
DZ Bank Germany 2.0
Natixis France 2.0
Swiss Re Switzerland 1.8
HSH Nordbank Germany 1.7
LBBW Germany 1.7
Commerzbank Germany 1.2




packages for individual financial institutions
provided by governments has amounted to almost
US$10 trillion worldwide. The losses of
international banks alone reached US$582 billion
by October 2008, and despite successive immense
investments by the US, UK and European
governments have remained weak in early 2009,
with the prospect that public ownership of a
significant number of banks may be the only
effective immediate remedy (see Table 1). 
As the financial crisis impacts upon the real
economy the fears of a prolonged world-wide
recession grow. The International Labour
Organization in Geneva estimated that up to
20 million people would lose their employment as
a consequence of the financial crisis, and for the
first time in a decade the total global
unemployment will be above 200 million. The
evidence in early February 2009 that over 20
million people will lose their jobs in China alone
demonstrates the financial crisis has now become
a global economic crisis. The desperate news from
the US car industry illustrates how the financial
crisis will further undermine already vulnerable
manufacturing sectors.
There is a widespread sense that this
regulatory failure of financial markets cannot not
be allowed to occur again. A problem in devising a
new financial regulatory architecture equivalent to
Bretton Woods is that dealing with digital and
interconnected global financial markets presents a
much bigger challenge. The outdated rhetoric of
the Bush administration about the dangers of
overregulation will be dismissed by US legislators
and the US public, alarmed at the potential
collapse of the US economy. The new US
administration is committed to reform of the
financial institutions, and having invested heavily
in the banks is in a position to demand change.
The proposals for reshaping international
financial institutions and reforming worldwide
regulatory and accounting rules agreed at the G20
summit are comprehensive and based on a sober
analysis of the causes of the crisis.
Weak underwriting standards, unsound risk
management practices, increasingly complex and
opaque financial products, and consequent
excessive leverage combined to create
vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers,
regulators and supervisors, in some advanced
countries, did not adequately appreciate and
address the risks building up in financial markets,
keep pace with financial innovation, or take into
account the systemic ramifications of domestic
regulatory actions.12
The commitments to strengthening
transparency and accountability, enhancing
regulation, promoting integrity in financial
markets, reinforcing cooperation and reforming
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international financial institutions, represents an
ambitious agenda. These commitments and the
diplomatic process that has delivered them suggest
that an important consequence of the financial
crisis is a defining move towards a multi-polar
world, with a new economic order in which global
regulation of international business and global
market oversight will be accepted as the basis for
market stability and integrity, With executive
incentives aligned to prevent excessive risk taking,
and reward sustainable business development. 
However the questions13 are whether the
deference of governments and regulators will return
when financial markets recover, and whether
financial institutions and markets will be free again
to pursue their own self-interest.
Thomas Clarke can be contacted on (02) 9514 3479 or
via email at t.clarke@uts.edu.au. 
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